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The Strength of Pro-European Consensus  
Among Slovenian Political Elites 
Matej Makarovič, Lea Prijon, Mateja Rek & Matevž Tomšič ∗ 
Abstract: »Die Stärke des pro-europäischen Konsenses unter den slowenischen 
politischen Eliten«. In this article, the authors analyse attitudes of Slovenian 
political elites towards EU and the process of European integration on general 
in the period of crisis. Namely, during the EU accession period, there was a 
strong consensus among political elites and in general public on desirability of 
country's integration into European institutional framework. However, the 2008 
crisis that strongly affected Slovenian economy and society brought the rise of 
negative attitudes towards EU and other Western supra-national political entities. 
The main thesis is that the Europeanness of Slovenian political elites is rather am-
bivalent since its attitudes are diverging and often inconsistent. 
Keywords: Political elites, consensus, integration, attitudes, European Union, 
Slovenia. 
1.  Introduction 
In the process of the ‘return to Europe’, meaning the inclusion of countries 
from Central and Eastern Europe in the European Union (EU), a very important 
– perhaps even predominant – role was played by national elites of these coun-
tries. This holds particularly for political elites who can be defined, according 
to Higley and Burton (2006, 7), as “persons who are able, by the virtue of their 
strategic positions in powerful organisations and movements, to affect political 
outcomes regularly and substantially.” It was the one that was handling the 
process of negotiations concerning EU integration, the respective decision-
making and implementation of the common European order. 
The lion’s share of the Central and Eastern European elites sees EU mem-
bership as a prerequisite for ‘Europeanising’ their former socialist societies, i.e. 
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the establishment of the institutional structure, values and principles that char-
acterise established Western democracies (Tomšič, 2016). But the extent of the 
compatibility of their values, knowledge and capabilities with the Western 
elites is of utmost importance. Similar holds true for their level of ‘European-
ness’, consisting of feelings of attachment towards European unification and 
integration, approval of its present state and the prospect of further develop-
ments in this direction (Best et al. 2012, 8). We are speaking about their feeling 
of European belonging and willingness to implement common rules and stand-
ards at domestic level.  
Slovenia used to be considered as post-communist ‘success story’ both in 
terms of systemic transformation and fulfilment of criteria needed for EU ac-
cession. However, due to its financial problems (high indebtedness, ‘immobi-
lised’ banking sector and increasing budget deficit), this small EU country 
came under the spotlight of institutions of the European Union. The crisis un-
covered structural weaknesses of the Slovenian model of socio-economic regu-
lation (Tomšič and Prijon 2014). It also debates and controversies – both 
among elites and general public – on future developmental model.  
In the last couple of years, the country experienced rather frequent change of 
governments (four in the last five years). All of them were, regardless their 
political ‘colour’, dedicated to common European rules and policy-guidelines, 
set by EU institutions. This applies also to their recommendations how to tack-
le crisis. For this reason, they were often accused of ‘blindly’ following ‘dic-
tates from Brussels’ what referred particularly to austerity-measures for estab-
lishing financial sustainability. However, despite declarative determination to 
introduce recommended socio-economic reforms, especially privatisation of 
state-controlled companies) and general liberalisation of institutional environ-
ment (in terms of establishment of business-friendly conditions, very few steps 
were done in this direction. It is a question thus whether this dedication was 
more a ‘lip-service’ than actual willingness to introduce necessary change.  
In the article, we hypothesize that the Europeanness of Slovenian political 
elites is rather ambivalent since its attitudes are diverging and often incon-
sistent. This ambivalence is connected to configuration of Slovenian elites, 
particularly to power-relations between different elite factions and perception 
of the impact that the Union could have in this regard. On the one hand, the 
mainstream elite of both the centre left and the centre right has always declared 
its pro-EU orientation. On the other hand, parts of the political elite, especially 
those trying to maintain some of the Slovenian political and economic specif-
ics, may see the EU as a threat to the status quo. The economic and financial 
crisis has made these fears clearer and more specified. However, even if they 
share such fears, the key political actors are far from willing to abandon their 
declared pro-EU stance. We claim that this ambivalence contributes to the lack 
of coherence in the elites’ attitudes towards the EU in a sense that the common 
EU policies are on the one hand followed but on the other hand heavily criti-
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cised and that the EU is on the one hand declaratively supported and on the 
other hand used as a scape goat, especially regarding the austerity measures.  
In the first section, we present main characteristics of Slovenian political 
space, with the focus on the relationships between different factions of political 
elite. Further, the conduct of political elite in the process of EU accession is 
thematised, as well as its behaviour during the crisis. This is followed by em-
pirical section where elite’s perception of different aspects of the European 
Union is analysed, focusing on a comparison between centre-leftist and centre-
rightist elite in this regard. 
2.  Configuration of Slovenian Political Space and 
Political Elite 
Political space in Slovenia is characterised by a bipolar division, consisting of 
two political blocs (Fink-Hafner 1997; Tomšič 2006; 2008; Jou 2011). This 
division largely covers the left-right cleavage since one camp is usually la-
belled in public discourse as ‘leftist’ and the other as ‘rightist’. This bipolar 
structure remained for the whole period, meaning that right-left division of 
political space became considerably stabilised (Bebler 2002). However, some 
changes regarding relationships took place within both political camps. In the 
‘left’ camp, Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (LDS) played the leading role 
throughout most of transition period, followed by Social Democrats (SD) and 
later by Positive Slovenia (PS) and now the Party of Modern Centre (SMC), 
although in the case of the latter, situation is more complicated since it is re-
cently established party with weak local organisation and without strong ideo-
logical ‘core’ (more on the phenomenon of this party follows). In the ‘right’ 
camp, the leading role was first played by Slovenian Christian Democrats 
(NSi’s predecessor), then by Slovenian People’s Party (SLS) and now for more 
than a decade by Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS). While in the ‘left’ camp, 
situation was rather stable through most of the transition period and become 
more volatile in the last years, in the ‘right’ camp’s situation became stabilised 
from the beginning of the century, with SDS maintaining its dominant position. 
For most of the post-communist period, the Slovenian political space was 
dominated by a ‘left-liberal’ bloc (Adam and Tomšič 2012). From the first 
parliamentary elections in 1990 onwards, there were eight ‘political turnovers’ 
(including the establishment of the first non-communist government in 1990, 
and the current one), in other words, changes of the political options in power 
(and seven different heads of government, including the current one). However, 
in this (25-year) period (1990-2015) governments not dominated by ‘left-
liberal’ oriented parties were in place for just seven and a half years.  
Elite configuration strongly affected prevailing cultural orientations, i.e. 
values and ideas in political space and society in general (ibid.). Namely, elites 
HSR 41 (2016) 4  │  198 
are the most important ‘cultural entrepreneurs’, i.e. producers and transmitters 
of cultural scenarios that affect political and social dynamics (Kubik, 2003). 
Certain observers speak about strong consensus-based politics that was charac-
teristic for post-communist Slovenia, pointing out relatively low polarisation 
between political parties and high agreement on national level with regard to 
key policy issues (Guardianchich 2011; Bennich-Björkman and Likić-Brborić 
2012). However, the situation with regard to elite consensus is much more 
complicated. It is true that all major political forces shared some common 
political goals like integration into the European Union or introduction of the 
Euro and also maintenance of main elements of welfare state (Fink-Hafner 
2006); but there is strong disagreement on many other issues, the ones that are 
related to strong ideological divisions (over the role of Catholic church, the 
nature of communist regime etc.) and fierce conflicts, described by some as 
‘cultural war’ (Kulturkampf) (Adam, 1999; Tomšič, 2008). When major inter-
national strategic goals became fulfilled, politico-ideological polarisation inten-
sified again. Although it seems that at the moment, these ideological conflicts 
affect pro-European consensus among the main faction of political elite, they 
might, if the crisis sharpens, bring the rise of scepticism towards European 
Union.1  
3.  Elites and the Process of EU Accession 
After the independence, there was a broad consensus shared by diverse political 
and other elites in Slovenia that recognised EU membership as one of the coun-
try’s priorities and main strategic goal. In that period, Slovenian political elites 
were, at least on the declarative level, strongly devoted to a pro-European ori-
entation (Tomšič 2006, Krašovec and Lajh 2008). Only one parliamentary 
party, the Slovenian National Party, expressed skeptical attitudes towards 
Slovenian membership in the EU, while other parties, belonging to either right 
or left political orientations, supported the membership. The attitudes of the 
political elite had strong support in the public opinion regarding the issue of 
EU membership. The accession to the EU that materialized in May 2004 was 
namely also strongly supported by wider public and considering publicly de-
clared support towards acceptance of the EU membership Slovenia was an 
example of most euro-enthusiastic new EU members. In March 2003, ten years 
after the accession process started, when the referendum on membership of the 
EU took place, 89,6% voted for EU membership. During the accession pro-
cesses Slovenia has, like other candidate states, adjusted its legislation to the 
acquis communitaire, i.e. the Union’s legislative setting. The adoption and 
                                                             
1  This can happen in the case if radical parties of both left and right gain on political 'weight'.  
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enforcement of established EU laws and implementation of reforms needed 
was continuously applied through the accession period, while the whole pro-
cess was being monitored by specialized bodies of the European Commission. 
Accession negotiations were completed in 2002 and in the next year the Treaty 
of Accession was signed in Athens.  
Since its membership in the EU, members of Slovene political elite have 
been taking part in joint decisions within EU institutions. There are eight Slo-
vene members of the European Parliament representing the interests of Europe-
ans. The meetings of the EU Council are regularly attended by the representa-
tives of the Slovene government. Slovenia has a member in the European 
Commission and representatives from Slovenia are members of both consulta-
tive committees, Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Re-
gions.  
Already during the accession process, most major political parties of that 
time became integrated in political associations with different ideological pro-
files at the European level. The LDS became a full member of the 
ELDR/ALDE in 1998; the SD of the PES in 2003; the SDS, SSL and NSi of 
the EPP in 2004, and Zares of the ELDR/ALDE in 2008. SMC became mem-
ber of ELDR/ALDE after it’s victory at 2014 elections. Integration into the 
European institutional framework caused only a slightly modification to the 
Slovenian party system. There were only minor changes to the programs of 
political parties which have primarily seen Europe as something positive, alt-
hough usually in a general (the importance of the EU per se) or using the EU in 
an instrumental fashion (stressing EU norms and standards) in order to legiti-
mize specific national related issues.  
However, we can also establish that the strong public support and positive 
attitude of Slovene wider public in a pre-membership period towards the EU 
membership didn’t transform into high participation rates in the case of EU 
elections. The first time Slovenian citizens could vote representatives to the 
European parliament was in June 2004. At the time of the elections, Slovenia 
had seven seats in the EP but this number was increased to eight after ratifica-
tion of the Lisbon Treaty. There were 1,628,918 citizens with this right to vote, 
although the total number of votes received was 461,879 (28.35%).2 In 2009 
the voter turnout was similar, with a total of 1,699,755 citizens having voting 
rights. For the eight seats of the EP reserved for Slovenia 12 political parties 
and lists contested. The total number of votes received was 482,136 (28.33%).3 
                                                             
2  State Elections Commisson: Elections to the European Parliament 2004. Accessed at: 
<http://www.dvk-rs.si/index.php/si/arhiv-evropski-parlament/leto-2004>. 
3  State Elections Commisson: Elections to the European Parliament 2009. Accessed at: 
<http://www.dvk-rs.si/index.php/si/arhiv-evropski-parlament/leto-2009>. 
HSR 41 (2016) 4  │  200 
In 2014 the share of voters increased significantly, being 42.61%.4 However, 
the increase in voters’ turnout in this case can be attributed to the domestic 
political agenda at that time (forthcoming national elections) and not to the 
broader European context. The campaign before the European election became 
highly ‘nationalised’, meaning the strong prevalence of national issues over 
those related to the EU. 
The initial pro-European enthusiasm of the accession period is also not re-
flected in the scope of participation of Slovene elites in EU associations. Partic-
ipation in providing expertise to policy makers at the EU level, interest articu-
lation, representation and lobbying is, similarly as in case of other new 
members from Central and Eastern Europe underdeveloped (see for instance 
Howard, 2003, Zimmer and Priller, 2004, Raik 2004). The participation in 
policy consultation is weak, while the understanding of EU-level networking, 
advocacy and lobbying in case of interest groups representation and the possi-
bilities, that it offers, in still unclear, even pejorative.  
4.  Elites and the Crisis 
Slovenia belongs the group of such countries as the crisis has had rather strong 
effects on Slovenian economy, which are reflected in and by many economic 
indicators, for example: a drop in GDP (from 55,589,863,776.2 $ in 2008 to 
49,416,055,609.2 $ in 2014), an increase of unemployment rate (from 4.4 % in 
2008 to 10.2% in 2013), a decline in foreign direct investments (from 
1,104,479.172 $ in 2008 to 1,503,189.329 $ in 2014) (The World Bank, 2015). 
In what follows, we present three figures, which summarize Slovenian (socio)-
economic situation compared to developed and innovation-driven economies 
according to the survey made by World Economic Forum (2015-2016) and 
presented in its annual Global Competitiveness Report.5 We have decided to 
                                                             
4  State Elections Commission: Elections to the European Parliament 2014. Accessed at: 
<http://www.dvk-rs.si/index.php/si/arhiv-evropski-parlament/volitve-v-evropski-parlament-
2014>.  
5  Which comprise annually analysed macro-economic indicators within 12 pillars. Competi-
tiveness involves static and dynamic components and is defined as a set of institutions, poli-
cies, and factors, which determine the level of productivity, which influences the level of 
economic prosperity. All factors, which influence competitiveness and growth are mutually 
connected. Therefore, it is important to analyse all of them and consider them when inter-
preting country's economic outcomes and progress. World Economic Forum has grouped 
these factors in the so-called 12 pillars of competitiveness, which tend to influence and re-
inforce each other, therefore they are considered as crucial macro-economic indicators, 
which reflect a country's competitiveness level and it's developmental potentials. These 12 
pillars are; Institutions, Infrastructure, Macroeconomic environment, Health and primary e-
ducation, Higher education and training, Goods market efficiency, Labour market efficiency, 
 
HSR 41 (2016) 4  │  201 
use data from this source as The Global Competitiveness Report analyses and 
assess competitiveness of 140 countries (economies) and provides valuable 
data about driver factors of productivity and prosperity.  
As it is shown in Figure 1, the key pillars were quite close to those of inno-
vation-driven economics, especially what regards business sophistication, 
financial market sophistication, labor market efficiency, higher education and 
training, health and primary education and macroeconomic stability. But, the 
figure next to it reflects Slovenian socio-economic changes, after the economic 
crisis has strongly penetrated into the pores of Slovenian society and its subsys-
tems (mostly in the economic field). The latter is reflected in deterioration of 
measured pillars from which it can be spotted that Slovenia is beginning to lag 
behind the innovation-driven economies. And if the most of the pillars of inno-
vation-driven economies improved, some Slovenian ones deteriorated, special 
what regards business, sophistication and financial market sophistication. A 
slightly better trend can be spotted in the case of Health and primary educa-
tion’s pillar. 
Figure 1: Comparing Slovenian 12 Pillars in 2009-2010 vs. 2012-2013  
Source: The Global Competitiveness 
Report 2009-2010  
    Source: The Global Competitiveness 
Report 2012-2013 
 
The WEF’s Global Competitiveness Report from 2014-2015 also shows a 
deterioration of some pillars (see Figure 2). It is essential to point out the dete-
rioration of pillars regarding institutions and innovation. While at the same 
time the pillar regarding health and primary education has risen. 
                                                                                                                                
Financial market development, Technological readiness, Market size, Business sophistication 
and Innovation. 
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Figure 2: 12 Pillars in Slovenia (2014-2015) 
 
Source: The Global Competitiveness Report 2014-2015. 
 
Global economic crisis in Slovenia cannot be researched separately from politi-
cal sphere, but first of all one has to understand Slovenian process of transition, 
which started with Slovenian secession from Yugoslavia and its independence 
in 1990/1991. Transition brought changes and progress, but at the same time it 
circumvented certain areas, which would urgently need restructuring. The latter 
is the result of a so-called gradualist approach to transition, which comprised 
slow and gradual disconnecting with a communist order and tradition. We 
cannot clearly define the type of Slovenian economic system, for which some 
experts claim it is still marked by strong elements of managerial capitalism 
(Szeleny, 1996) or crony-capitalism, which is characterised by entanglement of 
political and business elites (Prijon 2012; Prijon and Tomšič 2012; Tomšič and 
Prijon 2014).  
5.  The EU from the Perspectives of the Centre Left and 
the Centre Right: the Survey Results 
Divisions in Slovenian political space on ‘the left’ and ‘the right’ depart from 
their meanings in the context of Western democracies, to some extent blurring 
the picture of the Slovenian political space. The two camps are most clearly 
divided by their institutional origins and attitudes towards the communist peri-
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od, with ‘left’ expressing positive or at least benevolent attitude towards it 
while ‘right’ being highly critical in this regard. Economic cleavage is less 
relevant in this regard.2 The EU related issues were usually not a source of 
political divisions and conflicts.  
5.1  Data Analysis 
Within the ENEC cross-national comparative survey, 50 structured interviews 
were conducted with the Slovenian members of parliament in 2013 and 2014. 
For the purposes of our analysis, the MPs have been categorised on the basis on 
their party affiliation into three groups: the centre left, the centre right and the 
radical left. The independent MPs (who either left their initial parties or were 
expelled by them) have not been included in any of these categories. The clas-
sification is presented in Table 1.  
Table 1: Categorisation of the Slovenian Political Parties for the Purposes of 
the ENEC Survey 
Party Translation + Party Family Number of MPs in the survey Categorisation: 
SMC Party of Modern Centre, Left Liberals 13 Centre-Left 
SDS Slovenian Democratic Party, Conservatives 15 Centre-Right 
SD Social Democrats, Socialists/Social democrats 6 Centre-Left 
NSI New Slovenia, Christian Democrats 3 Centre-Right 
ZL United Left, New Left 1 Radical Left 
ZAB Aliance AB, Left liberals 2 Centre-Left 
DL Ciziten’s List, Liberals 3 Centre-Right* 
DESUS Democratic Pensioner's Party of Slovenia, Others 
(interest group party) 2 Centre-Left** 
PS Positive Slovenia, Socialists/Social democrats 1 Centre-Left 
SLS Slovenian People’s Party, Christian Democrats 1 Centre-Right 
/ Non-aligned representative 3 Not categorised 
* Although the party has initially participated in the centre right government and then played 
a major role in establishing the centre left government led by A. Bratušek, it can be classified 
as centre right since most of its key personalities have been traditionally positioned closer to 
the centre right and its president had started his political career in the governments of the 
centre right.  
** Because of its interest group character and participation of both left centre and right centre 
governments, the party is difficult to classify. However, its participation in the left centre 
governments has been considered by its members and the electorate as more self-evident than 
the participation in the centre right governments that has been subject to greater controver-
sies.  
 
                                                             
2  For example, the members of the business elite are proponents of ‘the left’ (unlike the 
situation in the West) while many of those who considered themselves de-privileged (often 
described in terms of injustices suffered during the communist regime) have supported ‘the 
right’. 
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Since the radical left is only represented in our survey by a single MP and it has 
remained quite marginal in the Slovenian political arena, it has not been in-
cluded in our analysis. Due to its firmly Euroskeptical views, it could be con-
sidered a special case quite far from the mainstream pro-EU consensus that has 
remained evident at least at a declarative level. After the exclusion of the three 
non-aligned representatives and the representative of the United Left, our fur-
ther analysis has been included 24 MPs of the centre left and 22 MPs of the 
centre right. Simple statistical analyses have been performed – using t-test 
comparisons of the two independent samples to compare the EU-related atti-
tudes of the centre-left and the centre-right group of MPs. After checking for 
the equality of variances using the F-test statistics for each of the comparison, 
the proper t-test scores have been obtained (based on the assumptions of the 
equality of inequality of the independent samples variances).  
At the most general level, one can hardly observe any relevant differences 
between the attitudes between the centre-left and the centre-right members of 
the parliament based on the ENEC survey. First, looking at the overall identity 
issues that are not necessarily related to the attitudes towards the European 
Union and its particular institutions, there are no significant differences in 
terms of attachment to the regional, national and the European level. 75% of 
centre-left and almost 86% of centre-right MPs expressed their attachment to 
Europe. The difference is statistically insignificant.6 Secondly, even when we 
move to the issue of institutional trust regarding the EU institutions, the situa-
tion remains the same as indicated in Table 2.  
Table 2: Trust in EU Institutions 
Trust in EU institu-
tions: 0-10 scale (0 = 
no trust at all; 10 = 
complete trust) 
Mean Values 
Equal Variances 
Assumed 
t-test 
value 
t-test 
significance Centre Left Centre Right 
European  
Parliament 7.42 7.45 Yes (F = 0.10) -0.07 0.94 
European  
Commission 7.25 6.59 Yes (F = 0.02) 0.52 0.60 
European Council  
of Ministers 7.46 6.59 Yes (F = 1.25) 1.56 0.12 
 
Thirdly, Table 3 indicates a clear consensus between the left and the right cen-
tre MPs that ‘the Member States ought to remain the central actors of the EU, 
and both groups of MPs are similarly cautious regarding the idea of the Euro-
pean Commission ‘to become the true government of the EU’. Regardless of 
their political orientation and clearly related to their national character they 
                                                             
6  Assuming equal variances for the attachment to Europe based on the F value of 0.02, the t-
test statistics only equals 1.03 with the significance level of P = 0.31. 
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both tend to maintain the significance of the nation states when compared to 
supranational alternatives.  
On the other hand, a slight divergence between the left and the right centre 
appears regarding the claim that ‘the powers of European Parliament should be 
strengthened’: the support for the strengthening of the European Parliament 
might be somewhat stronger among the centre right. The difference may be 
related – at least to some extend but perhaps not exclusively – to a rather politi-
cally pragmatic issue: the centre right political parties have been traditionally 
more successful at the European elections when compared to the national ones.  
The difference becomes more significant in the case of the European Central 
Bank, where centre right MPs are much more likely to agree that its powers 
‘should be strengthened’. This may be related to the differences in the econom-
ic views between the Slovenian centre right and centre left, which will be de-
bated latter, also regarding some further questions.  
Table 3: The Attitudes Regarding the Role the EU Institutions 
 How much do you agree (%) 
 
The Member 
States ought to 
remain the 
central actors of 
the EU 
The European 
Commission ought 
to become the 
true government 
of the EU 
The powers of the 
European Parlia-
ment should be 
strengthened 
The powers of the 
European Central 
Bank should be 
strengthened 
  Centre Left 
Centre 
Right 
Centre 
Left 
Centre 
Right 
Centre 
Left 
Centre 
Right 
Centre 
Left 
Centre 
Right 
Agree strongly 43,5 54.5 19.0 27.3 23.8 31.8 31.6 59.1 
Agree somewhat 47.8 36.4 38.1 40.9 28.6 50.0 31.6 31.8 
Disagree 
somewhat 8.7 9.1 33.3 22.7 33.3 18.2 15.8 9.1 
Disagree strongly 0.0 0.0 9.5 9.1 14.3 0.0 21.1 0.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Who agrees more Differences not significant 
Differences not 
significant Centre right Centre right 
Equal variances 
assumed 
Yes 
F = 0.11 
Yes 
F = 0.04 
No 
F = 5.30 
No 
F = 7.05 
t-test value t = 0.54 t = 0.70 t = 1.92 t = 2.55 
t-test signifi-
cance P = 0.59 P = 49 P = 0.06 P = 0.02 
 
Similarly, although there are no significant differences in the overall institu-
tional trust, the MPs of the centre left are consistently more critical in negative 
terms towards the EU institutions’ ‘management of the Eurozone crisis’ than 
their centre right colleagues. This includes the European Commission, the 
European Council and the European Central Bank. It can thus be noted that a 
shift from general (declarative) statements on trust to practical issue may bring 
forward significant differences. 
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Table 4: Managing the Eurozone Crisis 
Role of EU institutions in the 
management of the Eurozone 
crisis: 0-10 scale (0 = very 
negative at all; 10 = very 
positive) 
Mean values 
Equal Variances 
Assumed 
t-test 
value 
t-test 
significance Centre 
Left 
Centre 
Right 
European Commission 4.85 6.95 Yes (F = 1.46) -3.41 0.00 
European Council 4.65 6.37 Yes (F = 0.84) -2.97 0.01 
European Central Bank 4.05 6.71 Yes (F = 0.18) -3.79 0.00 
 
Somewhat lower levels of satisfaction of the centre left MPs are also manifest 
in their attitudes towards democracy in the EU: since 72.7 % of them claims to 
be satisfied ‘with the way democracy works in the EU’ – compared to the more 
than 90.5 % of their centre right counterparts.7  
Table 5: Perceptions of EU Related Dangers, Responsiveness and Efficiency 
 EU as a danger: EU endanger (%) Responsiveness/efficacy (%) 
 
the integrity 
of the 
Slovenian 
cultural 
system 
the achieve-
ments of 
welfare state 
system in 
Slovenia 
(EU decisions 
endanger) 
economic 
growth in 
Slovenia 
the quality of 
democracy in 
Slovenia 
Those who 
make deci-
sions at EU 
level do not 
take enough 
account of 
the interest of 
Slovenia 
The interests 
of some 
Member 
States carry 
too much 
weight at the 
EU level 
 
Centre 
Left 
Centre 
Right 
Centre 
Left 
Centre 
Right 
Centre 
Left 
Centre 
Right 
Centre 
Left 
Centre 
Right 
Centre 
Left 
Centre 
Right 
Centre 
Left 
Centre 
Right 
Agree 
strongly   16,7  8,3 12,5 30,0 65,2 10,0 
Agree 
some-
what 
8,3  4,2 4,8 25,0  4,2  50,0 38,1 30,4 60,0 
Disagree 
some-
what 
16,7 15,0 58,3 23,8 45,8 9,5 8,3 4,8 15,0 47,6  30,0 
Disagree 
strongly 75,0 85,0 20,8 71,4 20,8 90,5 75,0 95,2 5,0 14,3 4,3  
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Who 
agrees 
more 
Differences 
not signifi-
cant 
Centre Left Centre Left Centre Left Centre Left Centre Left 
Equal 
vari-
ances 
assumed 
No 
F = 6.00 
Yes 
F = 1.66 
No 
F = 17.34 
No 
F = 23.03 
Yes 
F = 0.00 
Yes 
F = 0.49 
t-test 
value -1.19 -3.46 -5.80 -2.23 -3.40 -3.69 
t-test 
signif. 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
                                                             
7  F = 6.17; t = 2.05; P = 0.05. 
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The differences become even clearer when we look at the assumed dangers to 
the national interests supposedly originating from the EU (see Table 5). Alt-
hough most of the MPs do not see the EU as a major source of danger, the fears 
related to it are consistently more present among the centre-left MPs. The latter 
are significantly more likely to believe that ‘EU legislation endangers the 
achievements of the welfare state system in Slovenia’, that ‘EU decisions en-
danger economic growth in Slovenia’ and that ‘EU endangers the quality of 
democracy in Slovenia’. Even the fear that ‘EU endangers the integrity of the 
Slovenian cultural system’ (that might generally be considered as a typically 
rightist-conservative fear) is not stronger among the centre-right than among 
the centre-left MPs (F = 6.00; t = -1.19; P = 0.240).  
Moreover, Table 5 also indicates that the centre left oriented MPs are also 
significantly more critical in negative terms regarding the EU responsiveness. 
They are more likely to agree that ‘those who make decisions at the European 
Union level do not take enough account of the interests of Slovenia at stake’ 
and that ‘the interests of some Member States carry too much weight at the EU 
level’.  
Table 6: Further Transfer of Powers to the EU 
Policy-
making 
prefe-
rences (in 
10 years) % 
Unified tax 
system 
Common 
social security
Single foreign 
policy 
More help for 
regions 
Issuance of 
Eurobonds 
Centre 
Left 
Centre 
Right 
Centre 
Left 
Centre 
Right 
Centre 
Left 
Centre 
Right 
Centre 
Left 
Centre 
Right 
Centre 
Left 
Centre 
Right 
Strongly in 
favour 20.8 10.5 29.2 10.0 45.8 65.0 75.0 35.0 21.7 22.2 
Somewhat 
in favour 50.0 42.1 45.8 50.0 41.7 25.0 25.0 55.0 52.2 55.6 
Somewhat 
against 25.0 26.3 20.8 25.0 8.3 5.0 0.0 5.0 21.7 11.1 
Strongly 
against 4.2 5.3 4.2 5.0 4.2 5.0 0.0 5.0 4.3 0.0 
Neither in 
favour or 
against (V) 
15.8 0.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.1 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Preferred 
more by: 
Differences 
not significant 
Differences 
not significant
Differences 
not significant Centre Left 
Differences 
not significant 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
Yes 
F = 0.09 
Yes 
F = 0.00 
Yes 
F = 0.78 
Yes 
F = 3.02 
Yes 
F = 0.60 
t-test value -0.73 -1.11 1.23 -2.78 0.90 
t-test 
significance 0.47 0.27 0.23 0.01 0.36 
 
Nevertheless, these differences are not reflected in any significant differences 
in the attitudes towards the further transfer of powers to the EU level are not 
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significant statistically regarding the support for the unified tax system, which 
is quite cautious both at the centre left and the centre right, common social 
security, where the situation is quite similar, single foreign policy and issuance 
of Eurobonds. The differences can only be proven statistically regarding ‘more 
help for regions in economic or social difficulties’, which is favoured more 
strongly by the centre-left MPs (see Table 6).  
Although the centre-left MPs seem to be more worried by the role of the EU 
institutions in relation to the nation state they are even more eager to support 
the redistribution of resources within the EU framework. A classical leftist 
issue of solidarity may thus prevail over some other fears, since 91% of the 
centre left MPs (compared to 72% of the centre right ones) agreed that ‘in order 
to preserve the common currency […] it is appropriate that the EU financially 
supports countries in difficulty, even if this implies transfers of resources 
among Member States’.  
5.2  Main Findings 
The empirical data from the ENEC survey clearly reveals some interesting gaps 
and inconsistencies. The general support for the EU, at least at a declared level, 
is rather high within the mainstream political elite and there is a broad consen-
sus between the centre left and the centre right. This is reflected by some of the 
most general attitudes towards Europe and even through the general trust to the 
EU institutions.  
While we move towards more specific issues, the scepticism and worries in-
crease, particularly among the centre-left. At the first glance, the critical scepti-
cism of the centre-left MPs seems to be related to classical leftist concerns 
regarding the protection of the benefits provided by the nation states. This is 
well in line with their worries about increasing inequalities within the EU and 
the almost unanimous support for redistribution between the Member States 
within the Eurozone. Some aspects of the EU may thus be seen by the centre-
leftists in the Slovenian parliament as a treat to the leftist value of solidarity, 
while solidarity at the EU level is – on the other hand – supported.  
Nevertheless, the situation is somewhat more complicated. The centre-left 
MPs do not only seem to criticise the EU when some of its policies are per-
ceived as threats to the (national) welfare state. They also worry more than 
their centre-right counterparts about the EU institutional impact to the econom-
ic performance and about the EU impact on democracy. Moreover, it is not the 
centre-right who is more worried about the EU as a potential threat to the integ-
rity of the Slovenian cultural system, implying that the elite of the Slovenian 
centre-left is far from being impressed by a culture of cosmopolitanism that 
might be provided through European integrations. The centre-left MPs are also 
significantly more critical to the particular responses of the EU institutions to 
the Eurozone crisis. These concerns are also reflected in lower willingness of 
HSR 41 (2016) 4  │  209 
the centre left MPs to transfer further national powers to the EU and its institu-
tions.  
This is rather inconsistent with the general views of the centre left MPs re-
garding the EU, where they do not differ in any relevant way from the views of 
the centre right. The inconsistency may imply a kind of gap between the de-
clared and the actual views and/or the persistence of some general political 
orientations that can hardly be changed without a radical redefinition of the 
policies of the Slovenian centre left (established since the end of the 1980s as a 
part of an overall pro-European consensus), combined by some practical con-
cerns of the Slovenian centre-left starting to believe gradually that some of 
their (more or less intimate) political views are hardly consistent with the pre-
vailing policies within the EU. Since the views of the centre-left seem to differ 
in this regard from the views of the centre-right, one can hardly speak about a 
general disappointment over the EU. If this was the case similar phenomena 
would be present at the centre-right – but they are not. Clearly, more in-depth 
(especially qualitative) research would be needed to clarify these gaps within 
the centre left. 
An inconsistency within the centre-right, on the other hand, may be linked 
to a complex relationship between the nation state and the EU. As already 
noted, the MPs of the centre-right are not more concerned about the preserva-
tion of the Slovenian cultural traditions than their centre-left counterparts. On 
the other hand, they are significantly less worried about the economic devel-
opment and democracy in the EU context and therefore less likely to object 
further transfer of state powers to the EU level. Although the relationship be-
tween the nations and the EU is complex and far from being a ‘zero-sum 
game’, some combinations of claims are still hardly consistent. This may re-
flect certain difficulties of the centre-right to reconcile fully its national-
patriotic and cosmopolitan pro-EU attitudes.  
The persistence of such inconsistencies may be seen as a result of inexperi-
enced political elites (which is not surprising given the lack of stability of the 
political parties and a disproportionally high numbers of newcomers in the 
Slovenian parliament after the recent elections). It may be also related to weak 
reflexivity regarding the EU issues caused by a lack of intra-party, media and 
other EU related public debates. The Slovenian MPs may simply lack external 
stimuli to force them to resolve certain inconsistencies and (re)consider subse-
quently their political orientations and actions.  
Till the beginning of the crisis EU-related issues were very rarely a matter of 
political disputes. However, when a package of anti-crisis measures entailing 
cuts in public spending and a reduction of the public sector, the privatisation of 
state-owned companies and reform of the banking sector was launched, not 
insignificantly due to the pressure of international political and financial circles 
and following a significant downgrade of Slovenian government bond ratings, 
this ‘outside’ intervention triggered anti-capitalist and anti-EU sentiments 
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among both the general public and the elite circles, presenting Slovenia as a 
‘victim’ of international financial circles and European policy-makers.3  
6.  Conclusion 
Relations between elite factions strongly determine the character of political 
setting. This applies also to the democratic system. Elite settlement that pro-
vides consensus over fundamental rules and principles is one of the key prereq-
uisites for stable functioning of representative democracy (Field et al. 1990; 
Higley and Burton 2006). Without at least basic agreement among elites on key 
strategic goals of society, consistent policy-making process can hardly take 
place. 
Elites are often perceived as generators of the process of European integra-
tion. However, they should not be seen as unified actor. As stated by Best 
(2012, 240), “the ‘Europe of elites’ is multifarious and polycephalic entity, 
formed by manifold national influences and shaped by differentials within and 
between elite sectors, elites and non-elites, and – foremost – between national 
settings.” In this regard, national elites – even those from smaller EU member 
countries like Slovenia – play a non-negligible role in shaping common Euro-
pean policies. Their actual influence in considerable extent depends on their 
ability to establish agreement on key political priorities.  
On declarative level, Slovenian political elites still share rather strong pro-
European consensus. Not only that there is no parliamentary party that advo-
cates Slovenia’s exit from the EU, but consecutive governments – regardless 
their political ‘colour’ – adhere to the policy-guidelines as set by EU institu-
tions. It is evident that they cannot ignore the international institutional frame-
work in which the country is integrated. This means that it has to follow the 
recommendations of the European Commission and other relevant institutions. 
Nevertheless, if these recommendations or even demands challenged some 
entrenched interests, they could provoke tensions or even revolts among their 
protagonists. Divergences between centre-left and centre-right faction of Slo-
venian elite in their support for EU’s institutions and their policies are related 
to their power and influence. Centre-left that is dominant in terms of both for-
mal and informal power tries to protect status quo and – at least part of it – 
                                                             
3  At the beginning, adherents to the institutional status quo first tried to downplay the 
importance of international assessments. For example, the leading advocate of the gradual-
ist approach, Jože Mencinger, stated that the country ratings provided by credit-rating 
agencies “should simply be ignored” (Finance 16.1.2012). Later, when the European Commis-
sion announced its reform ‘guidelines’ for Slovenia, evidently directed at liberalisation and 
deregulation, he claimed that the EC’s idea of competition is “destroying the EU” where 
“Slovenia is turning into an irrelevant province, worse than it was in former Yugoslavia” 
(MMC 2013), so “the government ‘should stand up against Brussels’” (Mencinger 2013).  
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could see interventions from the side of the EU institutions as instrument that 
could undermine their position. On the other hand, centre-right politicians often 
see the EU institutions as ‘external ally’ that could provide assistance in their 
effort to change ‘rules of the game’ and thus strengthen its positions. Due to 
this, it is – unlike the situation in many European countries – more pro-
European oriented than its political opponent.  
Slovenian political elites are still pro-European, but often in mere pro-forma 
fashion. In the case of a considerable part of Slovenian political but also other 
(business, intellectual etc.) elites, we can speak about some kind of reserved 
Europeanness. Namely, a considerable part of both Slovenian elites and public 
exert sceptical if not negative feelings towards Western type of capitalism. 
They see Western institutional setting – including the EU – as a mechanism of 
its maintenance. The economic crisis strengthened anti-European orientations 
as reflected in accusing EU institutions and its leading countries (especially 
Germany) of serving merely the interests of international financial circles and 
exploiting less developed member-countries of the EU. This is also reflected in 
rather critical attitudes of a faction of political elite (the centre-leftist camp) 
towards the conduct of European institutions – especially in relation to its han-
dling of the financial-economic crisis. One should also mention strong pro-
Russian sentiments that became evident during crisis in the Eastern Ukraine 
where, was very reluctant to support sanctions against Putin’s regime.4 On the 
other side, escalation of migrant crisis could provoke the rise of Euroscepticism 
also on the right side of political spectre. In this respect, attachment to the EU, 
its rules and principles is not as firm – and even less consistent – as it seems on 
the surface.  
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